NPRM Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act Requirements
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orThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Enterprise Homeland Threat Assessment reflects the insights from across the Department, the Intelligence Community, and other critical homeland security stakeholders. It focuses on the most direct, pressing threats to our Homeland during the next year and is organized into four sections. We organized this assessment around the Department’s missions that most closely align or apply to these threats—public safety, border and immigration, critical infrastructure, and economic security. As such, many of the threat actors and their efforts cut across mission areas and interact in complex and, at times, reinforcing ways.
Going forward, the annual Homeland Threat Assessment will serve as the primary regular mechanism for articulating and describing the prevailing terrorism threat level, which has previously been done through our issuance of National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) bulletins. In the future, the issuance of NTAS bulletins will be reserved for situations where we need to alert the public about a specific or imminent terrorist threat or about a change in the terrorism threat level.
Please see the below notice from FEMA on the extension of the Assistance to Firefighter Grant (AFG) Program:
“FEMA has been working with the General Services Administration to resolve interface issues related to SAM.gov that were affecting some applicants’ ability to begin inputting their federal fiscal year (FY) 2021 Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program applications into the FEMA GO System. Specifically, this issue included applicants that received error messages stating their organizations were not found and that their Unique Entity Identifier (UEI)/Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) combination did not exist despite the applicants’ SAM.gov accounts being fully active.
As this issue is ongoing, the FY 2021 AFG Program application period will remain open until January 21, 2022 5:00 p.m. ET. All applicants will automatically be granted this extension. This ensures that applicants affected by the UEI/EFT issue will have sufficient time to complete the online application. The extension to the application period will not affect the award timeline. In the meantime, FEMA continues to strongly encourage applicants to review the FY 2021 AFG Program Notice of Funding Opportunity and the associated tools posted on the FEMA website here: FY 2021 Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Application Guidance Materials | FEMA.gov. In preparation for application submission, applicants may also draft their narratives separately and cut and paste them into the appropriate areas of FEMA GO once the SAM.gov interface issue is resolved. The questions that are asked in the narrative section may be found in the FY 2021 AFG Program Narrative Get Ready Guide.
Fire Grants Help Desk: If you have questions about the NOFO or application process, call or email the Fire Grants Help Desk. The toll-free number is 1-866-274-0960; the e-mail address for questions is firegrants@fema.dhs.gov.The
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (AFG) applications are open. The goal of the grant program is to assist fire departments and non-affiliated emergency medical service organizations in meeting their needs to serve their communities. The grant assists these organizations in obtaining equipment, protective gear, emergency vehicles, training and other resources. Non-affiliated EMS organizations including non-hospital based (private or public) nonprofit, or governmental organizations are eligible to apply. Applications close on Friday, December 17, 2021 at 5pm ET.
Eligible organizations can review the help documents linked below:
If you need assistance in completing your grant application or have any questions you can call or email the Fire Grants Help Desk at 1-866-274-0960 or firegrants@fema.dhs.gov Monday-Friday from 8am-4:30pm ET.
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair, United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Dear Chairwoman Murray and Ranking Member Burr:
The American Ambulance Association (AAA) appreciates the opportunity to provide suggestions for bipartisan legislation to improve medical preparedness and response programs. The AAA is the primary association for ground ambulance service suppliers/providers, including governmental entities, volunteer services, private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and hospital-based ambulance services. Our members provide emergency and non-emergency medical transportation services to more than 75 percent of the U.S. population. AAA members serve patients in all 50 states and provide services in urban, rural, and super-rural areas. As the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration identified in its 2013 report on emergency services, EMS-only systems – such as our members – provide the vast majority of emergency ambulance services throughout America.
Our members are often the first health care teams to encounter patients who are sick and/or suspect they might have COVID-19. In addition to responding to 911 emergencies and transporting patients to appropriate destinations, they are also being asked to provide health care services within their existing State-defined scope of practice without transporting patients to help reduce hospital surge, as well as to protect high-risk patients from potential exposure to COVID-19. State and Local governments and public health authorities are also enlisting ground ambulance organizations to assist with testing suspected COVID-19 patients. In addition, ground ambulances provide important medical transitional care for patients moving between facilities in both emergency and non-emergency situations.
During this pandemic, our members have experienced first-hand the gaps in the public health infrastructure and the medical preparedness and response systems and programs. One of the most frustrating aspects of the current system has been the lack of recognition and support for communities that contract with non-governmental ground ambulance providers/suppliers in everything from federal grant programs to the distribution of personal protective equipment for EMTs and paramedics.
Many of the federal grant programs triggered during the pandemic have fallen short of their promise because the statutes and regulations governing them do not recognize non-governmental ground ambulance providers/suppliers as eligible entities. This distinction remains confusing because in other areas of health care, federal grant programs are accessible by private, for-profit health care providers and suppliers.
Outdated statutes and regulations often assume that first responders are governmental or not-for-profit entities and ignore the decisions of State and Local governments to contract with private ground ambulance providers/suppliers to provide 911 or equivalent services. As others have recognized, “State and Local officials know what works best in their communities – what works best in New York City may be much different than what works in rural Tennessee.”1 The federal government should respect these local decisions and support all first responders.
An example of this problem arose early during the COVID-19 pandemic. The FEMA public assistance grant program reimburses first responders for PPE and other expenses related to the response to COVID-19. When public and private non-profit emergency ambulance providers/suppliers sought direct reimbursement under the program, they were turned away. Private emergency ambulance providers/suppliers were required to have a State or Local government agency apply on their behalf. As State and Local governments responded to the public health emergency, it was understandably difficult for them to allocate resources to work through the application process on behalf of their contractors.
This differential treatment impacts communities across the United States, including those in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin, among others.
In contrast to statutes like the one government FEMA allocations, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. § 101) includes language that recognizes the decision of State and Local governments to contract with private not-for-profit and for-profit ground ambulance providers/suppliers within the definition of “emergency response providers.”
The AAA urges the Congress to adopt the Homeland Security Act definition of “emergency response providers” throughout the U.S. Code as applicable. Such language will help to make sure that when funding is available to help State and Local governments prepare and respond, the allocation mechanisms governing the funding permit all types of first responders, including non-governmental ground ambulance providers/suppliers, to access the dollars quickly and with minimal burden.
The Committee should carefully review federal public health programs and revise them as necessary to ensure that the funds may be used to support both non-governmental and governmental ground ambulance providers/suppliers to ensure that all communities, regardless of their individual decisions related to the entities operating their EMS systems, have federal funds to support their response efforts during public health emergencies.
On behalf of the AAA, I want to thank you for your ongoing support of EMS and ground ambulance providers/suppliers, as well as the leadership demonstrated by your work to prepare for the next pandemic. Over the years, the Congress has consistently recognized the vital and unique role that ground ambulance providers/suppliers play in protecting their communities and providing mobile health care services. In light of the lessons learned during this pandemic, we encourage you and your colleagues to revise antiquated language that no longer represents the innovations and progress that have led to State and Local governments to rely upon ground ambulance providers/suppliers, including non-governmental organizations.
The AAA and its volunteer leaders would welcome the chance to discuss this recommendation. We would also be pleased to participate in any fact-finding discussion or hearing that the Congress plans to host to better understand how the problems experienced during the current pandemic can be avoided in the future. Please do not hesitate to reach out to Tristan North at (202) 486-4888 or tnorth@ambulance.org, or Kathy Lester at (202) 534-1773 or klester@lesterhealthlaw.com to schedule a time for further discussion.
Sincerely,
Shawn Baird
President, American Ambulance Association
Vice President of Rural Services, Metro West Ambulance
1The Honorable Lamar Alexander, “Preparing for the Next Pandemic” White Paper” 4 (June 9, 2020).
When we think of trafficking, we generally think of drugs or weapons, not human beings. Yet the problem exists in numerous communities where EMS responders deliver care.
Human trafficking is defined by the United Nations as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by improper means for an improper purpose.” (End Slavery Now, 2018, para. 1) A more succinct definition comes from Kathryn Brinsfield, MD, MPH, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Chief Medical Officer for the Department of Homeland Security: “Human trafficking is modern-day slavery.” (DHS, 2017, para. 3)
Why is this so important in today’s EMS field? We are the first on scene, we are the ones invited inside where others are not and we are the ones who see an injured person’s environment. Our interactions with others can help us spot some of the tell-tale indicators.
Unfortunately, there are many reasons people are trafficked:
As an industry, there is much that EMS can do. We must keep our ears and eyes open, and report things that raise red flags in our minds. Some of the most common indicators we will see as emergency responders are:
DHS has a great educational sheet with additional indicators to look for: click here for a printable copy. While a particular situation may turn out not to be what you suspect, report your suspicions regardless so trained law enforcement experts can evaluate the situation. Your hunch may save a life or multiple lives. Call Immigration and Customs Enforcement at 1-866-DHS-2-ICE (1-866-347-2423) or online here. You can also receive additional training here.
References
Slavery Today (2018). Retrieved from http://www.endslaverynow.org/learn/slavery-today
EMS’s Role in the Effort to End Human Trafficking (2017). Retrieved from https://www.ems.gov/newsletter/marapr2016/end-human-trafficking.html
HHS OIG Analysis Part 2 of 2 – Read Part One of the Analysis
October 1, 2015
Yesterday, the American Ambulance Association summarized a report from the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on certain questionable billing practices by ambulance suppliers.
In this report, the OIG indicated that 1 in 5 ambulance providers had engaged in one or more of the following “questionable billing” practices”:
In this member advisory, I want to devote additional attention to the questionable billing practice the OIG referred to as “inappropriate or unlikely transport levels”.
The OIG identified 268 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (2%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of claims submitted with inappropriate or unlikely combinations of transport levels and destinations. The OIG summarized its findings as follows:
“We identified two types of transports billed with inappropriate combinations of destinations and transport levels. First, we identified emergency transports that suppliers indicated were to a destination other than a hospital or the site of a transfer between ground and air transports. We also identified specialty care transports that suppliers indicated were to or from destinations other than hospitals, SNFs, or transfer sites.”
The OIG went on to state that a high percentage of an ambulance supplier’s transports with inappropriate or unlikely transport levels (given the destination) could be indicative of “upcoding”. The OIG identified 268 ambulance suppliers that had particularly high numbers of claims submitted with unlikely or inappropriate transport levels/destinations combinations. These ambulance suppliers submitted 3% or more of their claims with these suspect combinations, compared to less than 1% for most ambulance suppliers. The OIG identified 19 companies that used a suspect combination on more than 25% of their claims.
Since the publication of the OIG’s report, the AAA has received numerous inquiries from members asking for guidance on how they can identify whether their company is at risk for submitting claims with these suspect combinations. Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to that question. However, based on my experience, I can offer the following general guidelines:
The suggestions listed in paragraphs #1 and #2 above address the issue of whether it was possible for your company to have inadvertently submitted claims with any of these suspect combinations. Even if you determine that it was theoretically possible for you to have submitted claims with any of these suspect combinations, it does not necessarily follow that any such claims were actually submitted. Most ambulance companies have numerous controls in place to guard against inadvertent mistakes in the coding/billing of claims. For example, while many billing software products permit an ambulance coder to duplicate an earlier transport for the patient, many companies elect not to use this functionality, preferring instead to code each claim from scratch. This removes one possible mechanism by which these types of inadvertent errors can occur. Moreover, even if it a claim was submitted with a suspect combination, it does not necessarily follow that the claim was paid by Medicare. Your Medicare contractor may have its own edits in place to deny claims submitted with these suspect combinations. Finally, even if a claim was accidentally submitted with a suspect combination and paid by the Medicare contractor, it is possible that you may have caught the error at the time you posted Medicare’s payment. Assuming that you properly refunded the incorrect payment at that time, there is no need for further concern.
Ambulance supplier should attempt to determine whether their billing software was designed in such a way as to prevent these suspect combinations from being submitted to Medicare. To the extent you are confident that it is impossible for these claims to be submitted to Medicare, there is nothing further that needs to be done.
To the extent an ambulance supplier determines that their current billing software edits do not make it impossible for such claims to be submitted to Medicare, they should determine whether the necessary edits could be implemented on a go forward basis. The ambulance supplier will also need to make an organizational determination on whether to investigate its past claims universe. This determination should be made in consultation with the company’s legal advisers. Your legal advisers will also guide you on the steps that should be taken if you discover that you remain paid for any claims with any of these suspect combinations.
HHS OIG Analysis Part 1 of 2 – Read Part Two of the Analysis
On September 29, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a report titled “Inappropriate Payments and Questionable Billing for Medicare Part B Ambulance Transports” (OEI-09-12-00351). The report, conducted by the Office of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI), looked at claims data for 7.3 million ambulance transports furnished during the first half of 2012. The OIG reviewed this claims data to determine whether claims were billed appropriately to the Medicare program.
The OIG determined that Medicare paid $24.2 million in the first half of 2012 for ambulance transports that did not meet certain program requirements for payment. The OIG identified an additional $30.2 million paid for transports for which the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at either the pick-up or drop-location, or anywhere else. Finally, the OIG determined that 1 in 5 ambulance suppliers met certain criteria that indicated they may have engaged in questionable billing practices. According to the OIG, more than half of all questionable transports were provided to beneficiaries residing in 4 metropolitan areas.
Medicare paid $24.2 million for ambulance transports that did not meet certain Medicare requirements justifying payment. This included transports to a non-covered destination, as well as transports to a covered destination but where the level of service was inappropriate.
The OIG determined that Medicare paid $17.4 million for ambulance transports to non-covered destinations. This amount also include return trips following treatment at the non-covered destination. These transports represented 0.6% of all Medicare payments during the first half of 2012.
The OIG indicated that transports to a physician’s office were the most common type of non-covered destination. Payments for transports to and from a physician’s office accounted for $8.7 million in improper payments. Medicare also paid $5.8 million for transports of beneficiaries to and from community mental health centers or psychiatric facilities (other than duly-licensed psychiatric hospitals). Other transports to non-covered destinations included independent laboratories, diagnostic or therapeutic sites (i.e., “D” modifiers), non-SNF nursing facilities, long-term care and hospice facilities.
The OIG determined that Medicare paid $7 million for transports with inappropriate combinations of the level of service billed and the type of destination. This included $4.3 million in payments for specialty care transports (SCT) where either the origin or destination was something other than a hospital, SNF, or intercept site. The majority of these inappropriate SCT transports involved transports between the patient’s SNF or residence and a free-standing dialysis facility. The OIG also determined that Medicare paid $2.7 million for emergency transports where the destination was not a hospital.
Medicare paid $30.2 million for ambulance transports for which the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at any origin or destination.
The OIG identified $30.2 million in payments for ambulance transports where the beneficiary did not appear to receive any Medicare services at either the origin or destination within 1 day of the date of transport. To account for the possibility that the ambulance supplier may have submitted a claim with the wrong origin or destination, the OIG only flagged a claim as questionable if its records determined that the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at any other facility type within 1 day of the transport. The OIG stated its belief that, since there was no record of the beneficiary receiving Medicare services at or close to the date of transport, the OIG believed that it was likely that Medicare inappropriately paid for the ambulance transports. The OIG did note the possibility that these transports occurred during an inpatient hospital or SNF stay, and therefore may have been the responsibility of the inpatient facility. These transports represented 1.1% of all Medicare payments during the first half of 2012.
The OIG determined that 1 in 5 ambulance suppliers had questionable billing
As part of the methodology used for this report, the OIG developed a set of 7 measure that it believed could be evidence of questionable billing practices. These seven measures were:
The OIG indicated that 21% of ambulance suppliers met one of the seven measures it developed for identifying questionable billing practices. 17% of ambulance suppliers met only 1 of the 7 measures, while 4% met 2-4 of these measures. No ambulance suppliers met more than 4 of these measures.
The OIG identified 2,038 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (13%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of their transports where the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at either the origin or destination. The OIG flagged an ambulance supplier’s billing as questionable if 3% or more of its transports involved situations where no Medicare service was billed at the destination. 46 ambulance suppliers had 95% or more of their transports involve situations where the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at either the origin or destination. By contrast, the median for all ambulance suppliers was zero transports where the beneficiary did not receive services at either the origin or destination.
The OIG identified 642 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (4%) that had questionable billing based on the average mileage they billed for beneficiaries residing in urban areas. The OIG indicated that the typical ambulance supplier average 10 miles for an urban transport. By contrast, the average mileage for the 642 suppliers identified by the OIG was 34 miles. The OIG identified 48 suppliers with an average urban mileage of more than 100 miles.
The OIG identified 533 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (3%) that had questionable billing based on the average number of transports per beneficiary. Beneficiaries transported by the typical ambulance supplier that provided dialysis transports received an average of 4 ambulance transports during the first 6 months of 2012. Beneficiaries transported by the 533 suppliers identified by the OIG received an average of 21 transports during the first half of 2012.
The OIG identified 358 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (2%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of their transports that were associated with compromised beneficiary ID numbers. In studying this measure, the OIG excluded ambulance suppliers that did not bill for any transports involving the use of compromised beneficiary ID numbers. Among those suppliers that billed any transports that involved the use of a compromised ID number, only 1% of the typical supplier’s involved the compromised ID numbers. The 358 suppliers identified by the OIG used a compromised ID number for at least 7% of their claims. 31 suppliers used a compromised ID number for more than 95% of their submitted claims.
The OIG identified 268 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (2%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of claims submitted with unlikely or inappropriate transport levels and destinations. For the typical supplier that billed any claims with an inappropriate combination of transport level and destination, these claims accounted for less than 1% of all claims submitted in the first half of 2012. For the 268 suppliers identified by the OIG, these claims accounted for more than 3% of all claims submitted in the first half of 2012. The OIG identified 19 suppliers that used an inappropriate or unlikely combination on at least 25% of the claims they submitted during the first half of 2012.
Finally, the OIG noted that the ambulance suppliers that tested “positive” for any of the questionable billing practices it identified were disproportionately likely to provide BLS non-emergency transports (including dialysis). The OIG noted that BLS non-emergency transports accounted for only 36% of transports billed by providers that did not meet any of its questionable billing measures, while BLS non-emergency transports accounted for 65% of all claims submitted by those suppliers it identified as having at least one questionable billing practice.
More than half of questionable ambulance transports were provided to beneficiaries residing in 4 metropolitan areas
The OIG determined that questionable billing was concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. These 4 areas accounted for 18% of all ambulance transports during the first half of 2012, but 52% of all questionable transports. Collectively, these areas accounted for $104 million of the $207 million in Medicare payments for “questionable” ambulance transports during the first half of 2012.
The OIG also determined that, on average, ambulance suppliers that provided transports to beneficiaries in these 4 metropolitan areas transported more Medicare beneficiaries and received more in Medicare payments than suppliers in other metropolitan areas. For example, the average ambulance supplier in Los Angeles received a total of $105,696 in Medicare payments, compared with an average of $16,137 in Medicare payments per supplier in other metropolitan areas. The numbers in NY ($85,606), Philadelphia ($56,667), and Houston ($34,951) were also far in excess of the national average.
In this report, the OIG makes a number of recommendations to CMS to reduce the number of inappropriate payments and questionable billing practices. These recommendations include:
HHS OIG Analysis Part 1 of 2 – Read Part Two of the Analysis
On September 29, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a report titled “Inappropriate Payments and Questionable Billing for Medicare Part B Ambulance Transports” (OEI-09-12-00351). The report, conducted by the Office of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI), looked at claims data for 7.3 million ambulance transports furnished during the first half of 2012. The OIG reviewed this claims data to determine whether claims were billed appropriately to the Medicare program.
The OIG determined that Medicare paid $24.2 million in the first half of 2012 for ambulance transports that did not meet certain program requirements for payment. The OIG identified an additional $30.2 million paid for transports for which the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at either the pick-up or drop-location, or anywhere else. Finally, the OIG determined that 1 in 5 ambulance suppliers met certain criteria that indicated they may have engaged in questionable billing practices. According to the OIG, more than half of all questionable transports were provided to beneficiaries residing in 4 metropolitan areas.
Medicare paid $24.2 million for ambulance transports that did not meet certain Medicare requirements justifying payment. This included transports to a non-covered destination, as well as transports to a covered destination but where the level of service was inappropriate.
The OIG determined that Medicare paid $17.4 million for ambulance transports to non-covered destinations. This amount also include return trips following treatment at the non-covered destination. These transports represented 0.6% of all Medicare payments during the first half of 2012.
The OIG indicated that transports to a physician’s office were the most common type of non-covered destination. Payments for transports to and from a physician’s office accounted for $8.7 million in improper payments. Medicare also paid $5.8 million for transports of beneficiaries to and from community mental health centers or psychiatric facilities (other than duly-licensed psychiatric hospitals). Other transports to non-covered destinations included independent laboratories, diagnostic or therapeutic sites (i.e., “D” modifiers), non-SNF nursing facilities, long-term care and hospice facilities.
The OIG determined that Medicare paid $7 million for transports with inappropriate combinations of the level of service billed and the type of destination. This included $4.3 million in payments for specialty care transports (SCT) where either the origin or destination was something other than a hospital, SNF, or intercept site. The majority of these inappropriate SCT transports involved transports between the patient’s SNF or residence and a free-standing dialysis facility. The OIG also determined that Medicare paid $2.7 million for emergency transports where the destination was not a hospital.
Medicare paid $30.2 million for ambulance transports for which the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at any origin or destination.
The OIG identified $30.2 million in payments for ambulance transports where the beneficiary did not appear to receive any Medicare services at either the origin or destination within 1 day of the date of transport. To account for the possibility that the ambulance supplier may have submitted a claim with the wrong origin or destination, the OIG only flagged a claim as questionable if its records determined that the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at any other facility type within 1 day of the transport. The OIG stated its belief that, since there was no record of the beneficiary receiving Medicare services at or close to the date of transport, the OIG believed that it was likely that Medicare inappropriately paid for the ambulance transports. The OIG did note the possibility that these transports occurred during an inpatient hospital or SNF stay, and therefore may have been the responsibility of the inpatient facility. These transports represented 1.1% of all Medicare payments during the first half of 2012.
The OIG determined that 1 in 5 ambulance suppliers had questionable billing
As part of the methodology used for this report, the OIG developed a set of 7 measure that it believed could be evidence of questionable billing practices. These seven measures were:
The OIG indicated that 21% of ambulance suppliers met one of the seven measures it developed for identifying questionable billing practices. 17% of ambulance suppliers met only 1 of the 7 measures, while 4% met 2-4 of these measures. No ambulance suppliers met more than 4 of these measures.
The OIG identified 2,038 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (13%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of their transports where the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at either the origin or destination. The OIG flagged an ambulance supplier’s billing as questionable if 3% or more of its transports involved situations where no Medicare service was billed at the destination. 46 ambulance suppliers had 95% or more of their transports involve situations where the beneficiary did not receive Medicare services at either the origin or destination. By contrast, the median for all ambulance suppliers was zero transports where the beneficiary did not receive services at either the origin or destination.
The OIG identified 642 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (4%) that had questionable billing based on the average mileage they billed for beneficiaries residing in urban areas. The OIG indicated that the typical ambulance supplier average 10 miles for an urban transport. By contrast, the average mileage for the 642 suppliers identified by the OIG was 34 miles. The OIG identified 48 suppliers with an average urban mileage of more than 100 miles.
The OIG identified 533 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (3%) that had questionable billing based on the average number of transports per beneficiary. Beneficiaries transported by the typical ambulance supplier that provided dialysis transports received an average of 4 ambulance transports during the first 6 months of 2012. Beneficiaries transported by the 533 suppliers identified by the OIG received an average of 21 transports during the first half of 2012.
The OIG identified 358 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (2%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of their transports that were associated with compromised beneficiary ID numbers. In studying this measure, the OIG excluded ambulance suppliers that did not bill for any transports involving the use of compromised beneficiary ID numbers. Among those suppliers that billed any transports that involved the use of a compromised ID number, only 1% of the typical supplier’s involved the compromised ID numbers. The 358 suppliers identified by the OIG used a compromised ID number for at least 7% of their claims. 31 suppliers used a compromised ID number for more than 95% of their submitted claims.
The OIG identified 268 out of the 15,614 ambulance suppliers reviewed (2%) that had questionable billing based on the percentage of claims submitted with unlikely or inappropriate transport levels and destinations. For the typical supplier that billed any claims with an inappropriate combination of transport level and destination, these claims accounted for less than 1% of all claims submitted in the first half of 2012. For the 268 suppliers identified by the OIG, these claims accounted for more than 3% of all claims submitted in the first half of 2012. The OIG identified 19 suppliers that used an inappropriate or unlikely combination on at least 25% of the claims they submitted during the first half of 2012.
Finally, the OIG noted that the ambulance suppliers that tested “positive” for any of the questionable billing practices it identified were disproportionately likely to provide BLS non-emergency transports (including dialysis). The OIG noted that BLS non-emergency transports accounted for only 36% of transports billed by providers that did not meet any of its questionable billing measures, while BLS non-emergency transports accounted for 65% of all claims submitted by those suppliers it identified as having at least one questionable billing practice.
More than half of questionable ambulance transports were provided to beneficiaries residing in 4 metropolitan areas
The OIG determined that questionable billing was concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia. These 4 areas accounted for 18% of all ambulance transports during the first half of 2012, but 52% of all questionable transports. Collectively, these areas accounted for $104 million of the $207 million in Medicare payments for “questionable” ambulance transports during the first half of 2012.
The OIG also determined that, on average, ambulance suppliers that provided transports to beneficiaries in these 4 metropolitan areas transported more Medicare beneficiaries and received more in Medicare payments than suppliers in other metropolitan areas. For example, the average ambulance supplier in Los Angeles received a total of $105,696 in Medicare payments, compared with an average of $16,137 in Medicare payments per supplier in other metropolitan areas. The numbers in NY ($85,606), Philadelphia ($56,667), and Houston ($34,951) were also far in excess of the national average.
In this report, the OIG makes a number of recommendations to CMS to reduce the number of inappropriate payments and questionable billing practices. These recommendations include: