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Author: Brian Werfel

Brian S. Werfel, Esq. is a partner in Werfel & Werfel, PLLC, a New York based law firm specializing in Medicare issues related to the ambulance industry. Brian is a Medicare Consultant to the American Ambulance Association, and has authored numerous articles on Medicare reimbursement, most recently on issues such as the beneficiary signature requirement, repeat admissions and interrupted stays. He is a frequent lecturer on issues of ambulance coverage and reimbursement. Brian is co-author of the AAA’s Medicare Reference Manual for Ambulance, as well as the author of the AAA’s HIPAA Reference Manual. Brian is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and the Columbia School of Law. Prior to joining the firm in 2005, he specialized in mergers & acquisitions and commercial real estate at a prominent New York law firm. Werfel & Werfel, PLLC was founded by David M. Werfel, who has been the Medicare Consultant to the American Ambulance Association for over 20 years.

Preliminary Estimate of 2018 Medicare Rates

A Preliminary Estimate of 2018 Medicare Rates

In this blog, I will provide a preliminary estimate of the Ambulance Inflation Factor (AIF) for calendar year 2018.  The AIF is main factor that determines the increase (or decrease) in Medicare’s payment for ambulance services.

Calculating the 2018 AIF

The AIF is calculated by measuring the increase in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) for the 12-month period ending with June of the previous year. For 2018, this means the 12-month period ending on June 30, 2017. Starting in calendar year 2011, the change in the CPI-U is reduced by a so-called “productivity adjustment”, which is equal to the 10-year moving average of changes in the economy-wide private nonfarm business multi-factor productivity index (MFP). The resulting AIF is then applied to the conversion factor used to calculate Medicare payments under the Ambulance Fee Schedule.

The formula used to calculate the change in the CPI-U is limited to positive increases. Therefore, even if the change in the CPI-U was negative over a 12-month period (a rarity in the post-war era), the change in the CPI-U cannot be negative. However, when the MFP reduction is applied, the statute does permit a negative AIF for any calendar year. That is precisely what occurred in 2016, where the change in the CPI-U was 0.1% and the MFP was 0.5%. As a result, the industry saw an overall reduction in its Medicare rates of 0.4%.

Based on current data, it is highly unlikely that the AIF will be negative in 2018. For the 12-month period ending in June 30, 2017, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) currently calculates the change in the CPI-U to be approximately 1.6%.

CMS has yet to release its estimate for the MFP in calendar year 2018. However, assuming CMS’ projections for the MFP are similar to last year’s projections, the 2018 MFP is likely to be in the 0.3% to 0.5% range.

Therefore, at this time, my best guess is that the 2018 Ambulance Inflation Factor will be a positive 1.1% to 1.3%.

Please note that this estimate assumes the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not subsequently revise its inflation estimates. Please note further that this projection is based on the MFP being similar to last year.  To the extent either of these numbers changes in the coming months (up or down), my estimate of the 2018 AIF would need to be adjusted accordingly. Ultimately, the 2018 AIF will be finalized by CMS by Transmittal, which typically occurs in the early part of the 4th quarter.

Impact on the Medicare Ambulance Fee Schedule

Assuming all other factors remained the same, calculating your 2018 Medicare rates would be a relatively simple exercise, i.e., you would simply add 1.1 to 1.3% to your 2017 rates. However, as part of its 2018 Physician Fee Schedule Proposed Rule (issued July 21, 2017), CMS proposed minor changes to the GPCIs. These changes can be viewed by going to the Physician Fee Schedule page on the CMS website, and clicking the link for the “CY 2018 PFS Proposed Rule Addenda” (located in the Downloads section). You would then need to open the file for “Addendum E_Geographic Practice Cost Indicies (GPCIs).”

If the PE GPCI in your area is proposed to increase, you can expect your 2018 Medicare rates to increase by slightly more than 1.1 – 1.3%. If the PE GPCI in your area is proposed to decrease, you can expect your 2018 Medicare rates to increase by slightly less than 1.1 to 1.3%.

If you are looking for a more precise calculation of your rates, you will need to use the following formulas:

Ground Ambulance Services

Medicare Allowable = (UBR x .7 x GPCI) + (UBR x .3)

 Air Ambulance Services

Medicare Allowable = (UBR x .5 x GPCI) + (UBR x .5)

 In this formula, the “UBR” stands for the unadjusted base rate for each HCPCS code. These are calculated by multiplying the national conversation factor by the relative value unit assigned to each base rate. To save some time, estimates for the 2018 unadjusted base rates are reproduced below (using the low-end estimate for the AIF):

Base Rate (HCPCS Code) 2018 Unadjusted Base Rate
BLS non-Emergency (A0428) $224.74
BLS emergency (A0429) $359.58
ALS non-emergency (A0426) $269.68
ALS emergency (A0427) $427.00
ALS-2 (A0433) $618.02
Specialty Care Transport (A0434) $730.39
Paramedic Intercept (A0432) $393.29
Fixed Wing (A0430) $3,049.69
Rotary Wing (A0431) $3,545.72

Plugging these UBRs into the above formulas will result in adjusted base rates for each level of ground and air ambulance service. The final step is to apply whatever temporary adjustments are in effect under the Medicare Ambulance Fee Schedule. For example, in 2017, there were adjustments in place for urban (2%), rural (3%) and super-rural (22.6% over the corresponding rural rate) transports. Note: these temporary adjustments are currently set to expire on December 31, 2017. Therefore, absent further legislation, they should not be added to the adjusted base rates for 2018.

2018 Projected Rates for Mileage:

 At this time, I am estimating the following rates for Medicare mileage:

Base Rate (HCPCS Code) 2018 Unadjusted Base Rate
Ground Mileage – Urban $7.23
Ground Mileage – Rural Miles 1 – 17 $10.84
Ground Mileage – Rural Miles 18+ $7.23
Fixed Wing Mileage – Urban $86.5
Fixed Wing Mileage – Rural $12.98
Rotary Wing Mileage – Urban $23.09
Rotary Wing Mileage – Rural $34.64

Please keep in mind that a number of assumptions went into these projections. The Bureau of Labor Statistics can revise its inflation figures in the coming months. CMS may announce an MFP projection that differs from what we expect. CMS may also announce that it is electing not to finalize its proposed changes to the GPCI (highly unlikely). If any of these assumptions was to change, these projections would need to be revised. Therefore, I would suggest that you view these as rough estimates at best.  The AAA will update members as more information becomes available in the coming months.

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

 

 

 

Talking Medicare: Prior Authorization Spending Update

Prior Authorization Data Shows Continued Reduction in Overall Spending on Dialysis Transports; Pendulum Swings Back Slightly in New Jersey and Pennsylvania

In May 2014, CMS announced the implementation of a three-year prior authorization demonstration project for repetitive scheduled non-emergency ambulance transports. This demonstration project was initially limited to the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. These states were selected based on higher-than-average utilization rates and high rates of improper payment for these services. In particular, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) had singled out these states as having higher-than-average utilization of dialysis transports in a June 2013 report to Congress.

Medicare payment data from calendar year 2015 showed the effect of the demonstration project. Total spending on dialysis transports was $559 million that year, down 22% from the year before.  That correlates to a cost savings to the federal government of $158 million. Telling, $137 million (86%) of those savings came from the three states that participated in the demonstration project.

The chart to the right shows total spending on dialysis in those states in the years immediately preceding the implementation of the prior authorization project up through the first year of the project. While the three states had very different trajectories prior to 2015, each showed a significant decrease in payments under the demonstration project.

We now have Medicare payment data for 2016. This blog will focus on the second year of the prior authorization demonstration project. This includes tracking the effects of prior authorization on the five additional states (DE, MD, NC, VA, and WV) and the District of Columbia, which were added to the demonstration project for 2016.

Existing States

In the first year of the demonstration project, both New Jersey and Pennsylvania saw sizeable reductions (85.5% and 83.5%, respectively) in the total spending on dialysis transports. Both states saw dialysis payments rebound in 2016, with New Jersey increasing by 14.7% and Pennsylvania increasing by 3.7%. The financial community uses the phrase “dead cat bounce[1]” to describe a temporary recovery from a prolonged or pronounced decline. It is possible that explains why payments increased for these states in 2016. However, the more likely explanation is that Novitas, the Medicare Administrative Contractor in both states, recognized that the standards it used were overly restrictive during the first year of the project. If so, the increases in 2016 reflect the pendulum swinging back somewhat. If you accept that Novitas has reached an equilibrium point, total spending on dialysis in these states would be roughly 75% below pre-2015 levels.

By contrast, South Carolina saw total dialysis spending decrease by an additional 7.9% in 2016, over and above the roughly 25% reduction in 2015. Thus, spending in 2016 was roughly 30% lower than pre-2015 levels.

Expansion to New States

The follow charts track dialysis payments in the five states and the District of Columbia that were first subject to prior authorization in 2016.  The chart on the left shows those states where the prior authorization project is administered by Novitas, while the chart on the right shows those states administered by Palmetto.

The phrase expresses the concept that even a dead cat will bounce if dropped from a tall enough height.

As you can see, both Delaware (72.3%) and Maryland (68.0%) showed sizeable reductions in total dialysis payments. Payments in the District of Columbia actually increased by 30%. However, a closer examination of the numbers shows that the increase was largely the result of an increase in the number of emergency transports to a hospital for dialysis, i.e., claims that fell outside the prior authorization project. Payment for scheduled BLS non-emergency transports fell 82.9% in the District, in line with reductions in the other two states.

The reductions in the Palmetto states was far more moderate, with reductions ranging from 27.8% (North Carolina) to 45.4% (Virginia). West Virginia saw a 36.0% decline.

Key Takeaways

 With two years of experience under the prior authorization demonstration project, I think we can safely come to two conclusions:

  1. The implementation of a prior authorization process in a state will undoubtedly result in an overall decrease in the total payments for dialysis within that state; and
  1. The size of that reduction appears to be more dependent on the Medicare contractor than on any perceived level of over utilization.

The first conclusion should come as no surprise. Dialysis transports have long been the subject of scrutiny by the federal government. Moreover, the original states were not selected at random; they were selected based on data that suggested they were particularly suspect to over utilization.

The second conclusion is less intuitive. After all, Medicare coverage standards are intended to be national. While you could argue that a sizable reduction was expected for New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as there was evidence of widespread dialysis fraud in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, there was no basis to suspect widespread over utilization in Maryland or the District of Columbia. In fact, the District had only 58 BLS non-emergency dialysis transports in 2015, i.e., the equivalent of a single patient being transported for 2 months. Rather, the 2016 data suggests that Novitas has simply taken a far harder stance on dialysis than Palmetto.

This has potential implications beyond the demonstration project, which is scheduled to expire at the end of this year. As many of you know, the national expansion of prior authorization is part of the House of Representative’s ambulance relief bill (it is not mentioned in the corresponding Senate bill). The data suggests that the AAA must continue its efforts to work with CMS and its contractors on developing more uniform standards for coverage of this patient population.

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.


[1] The phrase expresses the concept that even a dead cat will bounce if dropped from a tall enough height.

CMS Extends Moratorium on Non-Emergency Ground Ambulance

CMS Extends Temporary Moratorium on Non-Emergency Ground Ambulance Services in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas

On July 28, 2017, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a notice in the Federal Register extending the temporary moratoria on the enrollment of new Medicare Part B non-emergency ground ambulance providers and suppliers in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The extended moratoria will run through January 29, 2018.

Section 6401(a) of the Affordable Care Act granted CMS the authority to impose temporary moratoria on the enrollment of new Medicare providers and suppliers to the extent doing so was necessary to combat fraud or abuse. On July 31, 2013, CMS used this new authority to impose a moratorium on the enrollment of new ambulance providers in Houston, Texas and the surrounding counties. On February 4, 2014, CMS imposed a second moratorium on newly enrolling ambulance providers in the Philadelphia metropolitan areas.

On August 3, 2016, CMS announced changes to the moratoria on the enrollment of new ground ambulance suppliers. Specifically, CMS announced that: (1) the enrollment moratoria would be lifted for the enrollment of new emergency ambulance providers and supplier and (2) the enrollment moratoria on non-emergency ambulance services would be expanded to cover the entire states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. At the same time, CMS announced the creation of a new “waiver” program that would permit the enrollment of new non-emergency ambulance providers in these states under certain circumstances. The moratoria have been extended on these terms every six months thereafter.

On or before January 29, 2018, CMS will need to make a determination on whether to extend or lift the enrollment moratorium.

Talking Medicare: CMS Transmittal 236

On June 16, 2017, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released Transmittal 236. This Transmittal makes some minor changes to Chapter 10 of the Medicare Benefit Policy Manual. Specifically, CMS is clarifying its definitions related to the “ALS assessment” and “locality.” The change to the locality definition has prompted some discussion within the industry as to the impact on Medicare’s reimbursement for mileage beyond the nearest appropriate facility. In this month’s blog, I will explain the recent change, and hopefully convince you that this isn’t something that should cause you undue concern.

Medicare’s Definition of “Locality”

The definition of “locality” appears in Section 10.3.5 of Chapter 10 of the Medicare Benefit Policy Manual. That definition reads as follows:

The term “locality” with respect to ambulance service means the service area surrounding the institution to which individuals normally travel or are expected to travel to receive hospital or skilled nursing services.

CMS then includes the following example to explain how that definition should be applied to real world situations:

EXAMPLE: Mr. A becomes ill at home and requires ambulance service to the hospital. The small community in which he lives has a 35-bed hospital. Two large metropolitan hospitals are located some distance from Mr. A’s community and both regularly provide hospital services to the community’s residents. The community is within the “locality” of both metropolitan hospitals and direct ambulance service to either of these (as well as to the local community hospital) is covered.

Conceptually, the locality definition is intended to address situations where there are several local options that residents of a community could choose for the receipt of necessary medical care. CMS recognizes that a strict adherence to its general policy of only covering mileage to the nearest appropriate facility would undermine a patient’s right to choose from these various institutional health care providers. The locality definition ensures that, when the two or more facilities are reasonably close to one another, the patient can safely choose the further facility without fear that they may end up being responsible for some incremental portion of the mileage.

The Proposed Clarification

Effective September 18, 2017, Transmittal 236 adds the following sentence to the end of the current definition of locality:

The MACs have the discretion to define locality in their service areas.

Analysis of the Proposed Clarification

The first question that should be asked is whether this clarification is actually a change in CMS policy? I would argue that it not, as Medicare Administrative Contractors have always had the discretion to define what constitutes the “locality” for an ambulance transport. For that reason, I view the purpose of this Transmittal as simply clarifying “who” (i.e., CMS vs. the MACs) has the primary responsibility for making these determinations.

Nor do I believe that this clarification is being made in response to potential abuse of the locality issue, either by providers billing for excess mileage under an expansive reading of “locality” or by the MACs in processing claims. Rather, I think this clarification is being made in response to repeated questions from the provider community, both on Open Door Forums and at state association meetings with their MACs. In other words, I think CMS is simply making clear that concerns regarding locality should be raised with the MACs, rather than CMS itself.

The Transmittal does leave open the possibility that MACs could impose their own definitions of locality. However, as I noted above, they already have this authority. I am not aware of any MAC ever electing to define the issue. Typically, the MAC will simply restate the CMS Manual definition of locality in its LCD.

So why have MACs been reluctant, up to this point, to define localities? I think it has to do with the administrative burden that would be involved. First and foremost, the MAC would need to have a sense of the larger demographic trends that dictate patient referral patterns in any given area. While that information is available, in theory, it is not available in any way that is readily useable by the MAC. Moreover, as the test focuses on what is “normal” or “expected” for patients, this would be a moving target, as patient preferences change over time, new facilities open, other facilities close or change the services they offer, etc. Thus, to the extent a MAC defined a locality, it would be constantly forced to revisit that definition every so often.  Finally, the MAC would have to make allowances for transports that are outside the locality, but where the patient is seeking specialized care that may not be available within the locality.

In sum, defining the locality for even a single community would be a significant administrative burden on the MAC. When you consider that there are hundreds, if not thousands of distinct communities within each state, you can understand the MACs reluctance to offer specific guidance on this approach.

Instead, I believe that the MACs will continue to address the mileage issue in the same way they have done up to this point. Most MACs have imposed an upper limit on the mileage they will pay without question. This upper mileage limit may be for its entire MAC Jurisdiction, it could be statewide, or it could have two or more mileage limits for a particular state.  For example, some MACs use a smaller mileage edit for transports that originate in and around a major metropolitan center, and a larger mileage edit for transports in the more rural areas of a state.

This approach offers a number of administrative benefits to the MAC.  First, it limits the number of claims that run afoul of the edit, and therefore that potentially may need to be reviewed by the MAC on appeal.  It also offers clarity to the provider community.

So, if your MAC has previously indicated that it has a mileage edit, I think you can safely assume that this will continue to be the guiding principle used by the MAC after the effective date. If the MAC doesn’t have a published mileage edit, I don’t think that is likely to change come September.

I would suggest that ambulance providers continue to monitor their remittances. If you are seeing mileage over a certain amount consistently denied by the MAC, that is their mileage edit. Please note that the MAC is not indicating this mileage is never covered, just that it has determined that it will not necessarily pay this higher number of miles without seeing the underlying documentation. In other words, the MAC is putting the burden on you to prove that the entire mileage was covered. If you are not seeing mileage being denied, I wouldn’t expect that to change either. I hope this helps to put everyone’s mind at ease.

Have a wonderful Fourth of July.

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

OIG Looking into SNF Consolidated Billing Claims

Over the past few weeks, we have been contacted by a number of ambulance suppliers that have received letters from the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG). These letters indicate that the OIG is conducting a national review of ambulance services that are subject to the consolidated billing provisions of the skilled nursing facility (SNF) prospective payment system. The review covers claims for ambulance services with dates of service from July 2014 through June 2016.

In each case, the ambulance supplier is being asked to provide documentation on a handful of round trip transports of an SNF patient. The letter indicates that these services were furnished to a Medicare beneficiary during the beneficiary’s Part A SNF stay, and therefore “may be subject to consolidated billing.” The letter asks the ambulance supplier to complete a short (3-page) questionnaire related to the identified transports, and to return the completed questionnaire to the OIG within seven business days.

The questionnaire asks some fairly basic questions related to the identified transports, including whether the ambulance supplier actually furnished the identified transports, whether it was paid by Medicare, the point of pickup and destination, and information on who called to request the transport. The questionnaire also asks for information on how the ambulance supplier determined whether the patient was in the Part A period, and what information the ambulance supplier obtained in order to make its determination that the claims were separately payable by Medicare Part B.

The OIG has conducted similar reviews in the past. For example, in August 2009, the OIG issued a report on payments for ambulance transportation provided to SNF beneficiaries during calendar year 2006. That report concluded that 61 of the 114 claims it reviewed (53%) were incorrectly billed to Medicare Part B, as opposed to the SNF. Based on its sample, the OIG estimated that Medicare made $12.7 million in incorrect payments to ambulance suppliers during calendar year 2006.

It is possible that the OIG is simply updating its previous report on SNF Consolidated Billing and ambulance transports. However, there is another possible explanation for the OIG’s renewed interest in these types of transports. Many of the claims the OIG has requested information on relate to transports to what appears to be a physician clinic located on a hospital’s campus. If correct, the SNF would have been responsible for payment for the physician’s services (in addition to the ambulance claims). If so, it is possible that the OIG’s interest was triggered by the lack of a corresponding hospital claim being submitted to Medicare on that date.

If this sounds familiar to you, it should.

In September 2015, the OIG issued a report in which it highlighted seven so-called “questionable billing practices” by ambulance suppliers. One of these billing practices was the existence of an ambulance claim for a particular date of service, but where there was no corresponding hospital claim (or any other claim from a Part A institution) for the beneficiary on that same date. The OIG identified $30.2 million in payments during the first half of 2012 that tested positive for this measure.

In an earlier blog post, we discussed the Supplemental Medical Review Contractor (SMRC), StrategicHealthSolutions, LLC. The SMRC is tasked with lowering the improper payment rate and increasing efficiencies of the medical review functions of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The SMRC has recently started auditing ambulance suppliers, and it appears to be focusing, in large part, on claims where patients were evaluated at a physician’s clinic located on a hospital’s campus. It is possible that the OIG is conducting its own inquiry of this same issue.

This leaves us with a basic question: Is the OIG simply updating an earlier report, or is this sort of audit going to be become the new “normal” for ambulance suppliers? Ultimately, time will tell.

However, regardless of the OIG’s motives, this recent string of audits serves as a valuable reminder to the industry that many hospitals do sublease space to physician practices, and that these independent practices are licensed separately from the hospital. A transport to these independent physician practices would be bundled to the SNF under SNF Consolidated Billing. As an industry, we need to identify these transports when they occur, and be sure to bill the SNF, whenever appropriate. Otherwise, the OIG is likely to continue these sorts of audits.

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

UnitedHealthCare Denials for ALS-2 Claims

Talking Medicare

with Brian S. Werfel, AAA Medicare Consultant

Over the past few weeks, we have received emails from ambulance providers across the country reporting that UnitedHealthCare (UHC) has started to deny claims for the ALS-2 base rate. Affected claims include both commercial and Medicare Advantage claims. These providers are reporting that UHC is requiring the use of Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) Codes to support the ALS-2 level of service.

When these providers call UHC to question the denials, the customer service representative refers them to UHC’s online policies and procedures manual. The section of that manual devoted to the ALS-2 base rate largely mirrors Medicare’s definition. For example, it indicates that ALS-2 can be billed based on three separate administrations of one or more medications by IV push/bolus or continuous infusion, or upon provision of one or more of the designated ALS-2 procedures (e.g., an endotracheal intubation).

However, the manual section then goes on to indicate that “Ambulance Providers or Suppliers are required to report CPT or HCPCS codes… when reporting A0433Ambulance transport services that do not include the services described in criteria 1 or 2 above should be reported with a more appropriate ambulance transport code.

The manual section concludes with links to two lists of CPT codes. The first list, designated as “ALS2 Criteria 1 Codes” relate to the intravenous administration of various medications. These codes fall within the range of: 96365 – 96376. The second list, designated as “ALS2 Criteria 2 Codes” correspond to the various ALS interventions:

CPT Code:                            Description:
31500                                    Endotracheal Intubation, Emergency
31603                                    Under Incision Procedures on Trachea and Bronchi
31605                                    Under Incision Procedures on Trachea and Bronchi
36000                                    Under Intravenous Vascular Introduction & Injection Procedure
36555                                    Central Venous Catheter Placement, Patient Under Five Years
36556                                    Central Venous Catheter Placement, Patient Over Five Years
36568                                    Insertion of Central Venous Access Device
36569                                    PICC Line Insertion
36680                                    Intraosseous Line Infusions
92950                                    Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
92953                                    Other Therapeutic Cardiovascular Services
92960                                    External Electrical Cardioversion, Non-Emergency
92961                                    External Electrical Cardioversion, Emergency

The ambulance providers have indicated that they have questioned UHC on the necessity of including CPT codes on these claims. These providers argue, correctly, that CMS does not require the use of CPT codes on Medicare claims. Instead, Medicare requires the ambulance provider to document in the billing narrative the justification for billing ALS-2. For example, a provider might list multiple administrations of epinephrine, the use of an intraosseous line, etc.

The fact that UHC is asking for the CPT codes suggests that it does not currently review the billing narratives. Instead, UHC appears to be using the CPT codes to ensure that the ALS-2 criteria are met.

Is UHC correct to insist upon the use of CPT codes? Probably not, at least for its Medicare Advantage claims. However, I think the more appropriate question to ask ourselves is whether it is worth fighting UHC on this issue? If using CPT codes ensure that UHC correctly processes and pays these claims with minimal delay, my opinion is that it is probably easier just to comply with their policy.

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

CMS Letter Regarding Merit-Based Incentive Payment System

Over the past week, multiple members have contacted the American Ambulance Association to report that they have received a letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) related to their participation in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). The letter appears to have been sent to any entity with a taxpayer identification number (TIN) that is enrolled in the Medicare Part B Program. The stated purpose of the letter is to inform the provider whether it is exempt from participation in the MIPS program.

This member advisory is being issued to advise ambulance suppliers that:

(1) they are not eligible to participate in the MIPS program
(2) no positive or negative adjustments will be made to the ambulance suppliers Medicare payments
(3) no further action is required on their part

Therefore, AAA members that received this letter can safely disregard it. 

 

Understanding CERT

Talking Medicare: Understanding CERT

Every year around this time, our firm receives a steady stream of questions from AAA members about the CERT Program. Typically, the provider has received a notice from what appears to be the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which asks for medical records for one or two patient transports. These providers naturally wonder whether they are being audited, and how they should respond. The intent of this post is to clear up any confusion.

What is the CERT program?

The Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) program is an attempt by CMS to measure the rate of improper payments in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program. It does so by evaluating a statistically valid random sample of claims to determine whether these claims were properly paid under the applicable Medicare coverage, coding, and billing rules.

In August 2016, CMS awarded responsibility for conducting CERT reviews to AdvanceMed. Therefore, if you receive a letter from AdvanceMed, and that review is asking for only a single claim, it is likely that you are being asked to participate in the FY 2017 CERT review.

What is the National Error Rate for ambulance services?

In its report for Fiscal Year 2016, CMS indicated that the overall improper payment rate was 11.00% across all provider types. CMS estimated that this represented approximately $41.08 billion in improper payments. This is down slightly from the FY 2015 review, which estimated the improper payment rate at 12.09%, representing $43.33 billion in improper payments. The FY 2016 reporting period ran from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015.

The overall error rate for Part A Providers, i.e., hospitals, nursing homes, etc., was 13.98%. The overall error rate for Part B providers was 11.71%.  In contrast, the error rate for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DME) was 46.26%.

The overall error rate for ambulance was 11.7%, or basically the same as the overall Part B error rate. The ambulance error rate was further broken down based on the basis for a payment error. The most common error, comprising more than three-fourths of all errors, was either no documentation or insufficient documentation. The lack of medical necessity for the ambulance comprised only 15.6% of all improperly paid ambulance claims.

Should I freak out if my service is selected for review?

In a word, “No.” The odds of your service being selected under the CERT program are quite low. If you are selected, it is helpful to keep in mind that the focus of this review is not on your billing practices. Rather, the focus is on whether your contractor processed your claim correctly. This is not to say that CMS will not attempt to recoup payment on the claim if it ultimately determines that the claim was paid in error; it will. However, from your perspective, that recoupment is the end of the matter.

In other words, the worst that can happen with a CERT review is that you would have to repay that single claim. It will not result in a large extrapolated overpayment. Nor is the denial of that claim likely to trigger a larger postpayment review. Therefore, other than being sure to respond to the record request in a timely fashion, there is little to fear from CERT.

I hope this helps put your mind at ease!


Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

The Return of the Supplemental Medical Review Contractor

In a November 2016 member advisory, we discussed StrategicHealthSolutions, LLC (Strategic), the CMS Supplemental Medical Review Contractor (SMRC). The SMRC is tasked by CMS to perform a variety of tasks aimed at lowering the improper payment rates and increasing the efficiencies of the medical review functions of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. In other words, the Strategic is yet another audit contractor.

In our earlier member advisory, we indicated that the Strategic had sent letters to a number of ambulance suppliers requesting medical records for certain ambulance transports. Those letters indicated that the Strategic was tasked with performing postpayment reviews of “Part B therapy claims for providers with a high percentage of patients receiving therapy beyond the threshold as compared to their peers.”

At this point, you are probably asking what the physical therapy cap threshold has to do with claims for ambulance services. If so, you are not alone.

On behalf of the AAA, our firm contacted Strategic to request further clarification. Specifically, we asked whether the intent was to limit its review to physical therapy providers, or whether the intent was to audit ambulance suppliers. Strategic responded by indicating that it intended to limit its review to physical therapy services, and that these letters were sent to ambulance suppliers in error. To its credit, Strategic did contact the affected ambulance suppliers by telephone to notify them of its error. Strategic also sent letters to the affected ambulance suppliers formally rescinding the record request.

Score one for the good guys, right? Think again.

Over the past few days, we have been notified by numerous AAA members that they have received a letter from Strategic requesting records for certain ambulance transports. These letters indicate that these postpayment reviews are being directed by CMS, and are based on an analysis of national claims data.

The audit notification letters cite the HHS Office of the Inspector General’s 2015 report on question billing practices as the establishing “good cause” for reopening the claims being audited. That report identified 7 billing practices that the OIG considered “questionable.”  Among the OIG findings being cited by Strategic are: (1) that CMS paid $17 million during the first half of 2012 for ambulance transports to and from a physician’s office and (2) that CMS paid $30 million over that same period for transports where there existed no record of the patient receiving covered Medicare services at either the pickup or drop-off locations on that date of service.

So, having cited two examples of improper payments from the industry as a whole as the basis to audit specific ambulance providers, one would naturally expect that the claims being audited would be limited to those instances, right? Unfortunately, when CMS and its contractors are involved, it is rarely that that simple.

Instead, Strategic appears to be consistently asking for samples of 40 or so claims. While it is difficult to discern a pattern from the handful of audit letters I have seen, one point of emphasis does appear to be ALS emergency claims, which typically represent more than half the sample being requested. However, in each case, the remaining claims come from each of the various base rates. In other words, it is possible that the claims being selected are truly random.

It is premature to speculate on how these audits turn out. However, the initial misstep by Strategic does not inspire confidence.

If you receive a letter from Strategic, it is important that you respond within the time frames set forth in your letter. If you are unable to meet that deadline, I would strongly recommend that you contact Strategic to ask for an extension. Typically, the contractor will grant an extension of 30 days as a courtesy. I would also use that time to obtain supporting documentation from the hospitals and SNFs. Given the scrutiny currently being paid to the patient signature requirement, I would review each claim to ensure that the requirement has been met. To the extent you are relying upon a facility signature, I would verify that the signature is legible (or accompanied by the signer’s printed name). If it is not, I would suggest obtaining a signature attestation from the individual that signed.

Please keep in mind that the best way to avoid a potential recoupment is to convince the contractor that the claim was properly paid in the first place. Maximum effort prior to your initial response is likely to pay big dividends down the road.


Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

The Future of Prior Authorization

In May 2014, CMS announced the creation of a three-year demonstration project that calls for the prior authorization of repetitive scheduled non-emergency ambulance transports. The demonstration project was first implemented in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. These states were selected based on their higher-than-average utilization rates for repetitive ground ambulance transportation. For example, in a June 2013 report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) cited these states as having particular high utilization rates for dialysis transports. Prior authorization went live in these states on December 15, 2014.

Congress Acts to Expand the Prior Authorization Regime

On April 16, 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015. Section 515 of that law required CMS to expand the demonstration program into five additional states (Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia on or before January 1, 2016. The law further instructed CMS to expand the prior authorization regime to the rest of the country beginning no earlier than January 1, 2017. However, the national expansion was conditioned on CMS determining that the demonstration project has been effective in reducing Medicare expenditures without jeopardizing patient’s access to necessary medical care.

Short Term Prospects for Expansion

As of the end of January 2017, CMS has yet to issue its report on the effectiveness of the prior authorization program in the original 8 states and the District of Columbia. Therefore, there it is highly unlikely that CMS will be expanding the program nationally in the foreseeable future. However, CMS has not officially ruled out the possibility of expanding the program at some point during 2017.

While CMS has not officially ruled out a national expansion in 2017, I rate the prospect as unlikely. I base this statement simply on the calendar. Even if CMS were to issue the required certifications tomorrow, it would still need to give its contractors instructions on how to implement the program. It would also need to give some advance notice to the provider community. If you assume it would want to give everyone involved at least a month to prepare, it would be April at the earliest before it could expand the program. Personally, I have a hard time believing that CMS would go through all that trouble—not to mention allocating the necessary funding—for 8 months.

Long Term Prospects for Prior Authorization

While I rate the short term prospects for prior authorization to be unlikely, I think that our industry should expect prior authorization for repetitive patients to be part of our long term future.

The data thus far suggests that prior authorization is highly effective at reducing Medicare expenditures. In 2014, the last year before prior authorization went into effect, Medicare paid more than $106 million for dialysis transports in New Jersey alone. In 2015, total spending on dialysis decreased to slightly more than $15 million, a decrease of more than 85%. While there has been anecdotal reports of patients in the state being unable to obtain transportation to their dialysis appointments, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that these are anything other than isolated occurrences, or that prior authorization is contributing to a systematic lack of access. The data from Pennsylvania and South Carolina shows similar dramatic decreases in spending on dialysis.

Collectively, total spending on dialysis in these three states was approximately $140 million less in 2015 than 2014. This corresponds to nearly 20% of total dialysis spending in 2014. To put these reductions in their proper perspective, it may be helpful to remember that the Congressional Budget Office scores the cost of our existing temporary adjustments (i.e., the 2% urban, 3% rural and super rural adjustments) at approximately $100 million a year.

Some will argue that the 2015 reductions in these states were magnified by what can be charitably described as “friction” in the implementation of the program. (We recognize that affected providers in these states are likely to use far less charitable descriptions.) These people would argue that the reductions in subsequent years is likely to be less dramatic. CMS will be releasing 2016 payment data in a few months; at which point we will know whether this prediction proves true. Regardless of whether the data shows an uptick in payments in these states, that same data is almost guaranteed to show a dramatic decrease in total spending on dialysis in these states over the 2014 base year.

In sum, the data makes clear that prior authorization offers substantial cost savings to the federal government. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of these cost savings come from dialysis transports, an area that CMS has long-identified with fraud, abuse, and overutilization. This represents a tempting target for both CMS and Congress when looking for future cost-savings.


Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

CMS Extends Temporary Moratorium (NJ, PA, TX)

On January 9, 2017, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a notice in the Federal Register extending the temporary moratoria on the enrollment of new Medicare Part B non-emergency ground ambulance providers and suppliers in the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The extended moratoria will run through July 29, 2017.

Section 6401(a) of the Affordable Care Act granted CMS the authority to impose temporary moratoria on the enrollment of new Medicare providers and suppliers to the extent doing so was necessary to combat fraud or abuse. On July 31, 2013, CMS used this new authority to impose a moratorium on the enrollment of new ambulance providers in Houston, Texas and the surrounding counties. On February 4, 2014, CMS imposed a second moratorium on newly enrolling ambulance providers in the Philadelphia metropolitan areas. These moratoria have been extended every six months thereafter.

However, on August 3, 2016, CMS announced changes to its existing moratoria on the enrollment of new ground ambulance suppliers. Specifically, CMS announced that the moratoria would be lifted for the enrollment of new emergency ambulance providers and supplier, but that it would expand the enrollment moratorium on non-emergency ambulance services to cover the entire states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas. At the same time, CMS announced the creation of a new “waiver” program that would permit the enrollment of new non-emergency ambulance providers in these states under certain circumstances.

On or before July 29, 2017, CMS will need to make a determination on whether to extend or lift the enrollment moratorium.

Have a Medicare question? AAA members, send your inquiry to Brian Werfel, Esq. using our simple form!

Federal Judge Offers Hope for Reduction in ALJ Appeal Backlog

As our industry prepares to close the book on 2016 and turns its eye to 2017, I want to focus your attention on a recent federal court ruling that has the potential to significantly reduce the current backlog of appeals pending Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearings.

The Medicare regulations require ALJs to conduct a hearing and issue a written decision within 90 days of the filing of an appeal. However, the average time to process decisions has skyrocketed in recent years, from 94.9 days in FY 2009 to nearly 2.5 years in FY 2016. Those statistics come from the CMS Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA). On their face, those numbers may seem discouraging; however, the reality is far worse. Those numbers reflect the average time to render a decision on appeals filed by both beneficiaries and health care providers. However, the law requires the ALJs to give priority to appeals filed by beneficiaries. OMHA has indicated that it continues to decide these cases within approximately 90 days.

Of course, if the appeals filed by beneficiaries continue to be decided within 90 days, the pending appeals filed by health care providers must be delayed even further. In July 2016, OMHA indicated that there were approximately 750,000 claims currently awaiting ALJ hearings. This statement was made in the context of OMHA taking credit for increasing its capacity for processing appeals to approximately 77,000 claims a year. In other words, it is possible that the expected time for a hearing on an appeal filed today could be close to 10 years.

Enter the American Hospital Association. In May 2014, the AHA filed a lawsuit in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a writ of mandamus (lawyer-speak for “I would really appreciate it if you forced this government official to do his or her job”) to compel the Secretary of Health and Human Services to comply with statutorily imposed deadlines for ALJ decisions. In other words, the AHA was asking the court to force CMS to eliminate the ALJ backlog.

District Court Judge James E. Boasberg initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The AHA then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which, in 2016, reversed the dismissal, and remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The Circuit Court specifically instructed the judge to determine whether “compelling equitable grounds” existed to justify the issuance of the writ.

CMS then moved to stay further proceedings until September 30, 2017. This is the close of the next full appropriations cycle, and CMS argued that this would give it time to pursue various administrative and legislative efforts to reduce the ALJ backlog. The court denied that request, finding that sufficient grounds existed to justify the writ of mandamus. The court then asked the parties to submit written suggestions on the form such mandamus relief should take. Both CMS and the AHA then submitted suggestions for how to deal with the issue.

The AHA proposed two possible avenues to reduce the backlog:

  1. CMS should: (i) offer reasonable settlements to broad groups of Medicare providers and suppliers (similar to its periodic settlement offers to hospitals over the past few years), (ii) defer the obligation for providers and suppliers to repay outstanding overpayments, and toll the accumulation of interest, while their ALJ appeal was pending, and (iii) impose financial penalties on RACs that have high reversal rates; or
  2. Set specific numeric targets for reducing the backlog over a four year period. These targets would be: (i) a 30% reduction in the backlog by December 31, 2017, (ii) a 60% reduction by December 31, 2018, (iii) a 90% reduction by December 31, 2019, and (iv) the elimination of the backlog by December 31, 2020. The AHA also recommended that, to the extent a backlog still existed on January 1, 2021, that any provider or supplier with an ALJ appeal pending for more than 1 year be granted summary judgment.

CMS objected to each of these requirements. Instead, CMS continued to argue that time should be allowed for its recent initiatives to have the desired impact. However, CMS indicated that the ultimate elimination of this backlog would require legislative action.

On December 6, 2016, Judge Boasberg issued his ruling. In his decision, he stated that, while he was sympathetic to the challenges faced by CMS, he found CMS’ argument somewhat less than persuasive. Moreover, he indicated that CMS’ plan was largely contingent on Congressional intervention, which was by no means a sure thing. However, the Judge indicated that he was hesitant to intrude upon CMS’ specific decision-making process. For that reason, he rejected the specific proposals offered by the AHA. Instead, he elected to adopt the AHA’s proposed timetable for reducing the backlog. The Judge did refuse to grant the AHA’s request that providers automatically be granted summary judgment if the backlog was not eliminated by 2021, agreeing with CMS that this might create some perverse incentives for providers and suppliers to file non-meritorious appeals. Instead, he indicated that, to the extent the backlog is not eliminated by that date, individual providers or suppliers would have the option of moving for default judgment or to seek their own writ of mandamus to compel an immediate hearing. Finally, the Judge ordered CMS to provide status reports every 90 days on its efforts to reduce the backlog.

In sum, a federal court has now ordered CMS to eliminate the current ALJ backlog over the next four years. It is likely that CMS will appeal this decision, and, therefore, this is unlikely to be the last time the courts weigh in on this issue. Moreover, even if the court order stands, it is unclear how CMS could significantly reduce the backlog without securing additional financial resources from Congress. One option might be to expand its settlement offers to additional provider groups. Another might be slow-down the pre- and postpayment audits that feed the appeals pipeline. However, these are purely speculative at this time.

Thus, the court’s decision is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on appeals in the near future. However, it is almost 2017, and I for one am choosing to be optimistic.

Best Wishes for a Happy and Healthy New Year!

 

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Submit your question!

GAO Report on Revised Provider Enrollment Screening Process

In March 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a revised process for processing the enrollment of new Medicare providers and suppliers. This revised process also applied to existing Medicare providers and suppliers that were revalidating their enrollment information. This new process included assigning all providers and suppliers to one of three risk categories—limited, moderate, and high—based on the perceived risk of fraud and abuse. The risk category then determines the applicable screening process used for providers within that risk category.

Please note that ambulance providers and suppliers were placed in the moderate risk category. This risk category includes a verification of the information provided by the provider on its enrollment application, a check of the provider’s state licensure, a check of any adverse legal actions against the provider, and a site visit of the provider.

On December 15, 2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the initial results of this revised provider enrollment screening process.

In its report, the GAO indicated that CMS applied its revised enrollment screening process to over 2.4 million newly enrolling and revalidating Medicare providers and suppliers from March 25, 2011 through December 31, 2015. Other relevant findings include:

  • The total number of enrolled Medicare providers and suppliers increased from 1.4 million in March 2011 to 1.9 million in December 2015, an increase of more than 30%.
  • CMS denied more than 6,000 applications for ineligible providers and suppliers. The most commonly cited reason for a denial was the failure of applicant to meet the provider/supplier type requirements. This included situations where the provider/supplier did not hold the required certification for that provider/supplier type.
  • CMS rejected 17,000 applications as incomplete. The GAO found that approximately 25% of the rejected applications were the result of the application being filed in error, either by the provider/supplier or the MAC. 21% of applications were rejected as being duplicates. Another 16% of rejections were the result of the provider/supplier failing to timely respond to the MAC’s request for additional information.
  • CMS screening of existing providers/suppliers resulted in more than 660,000 provider numbers being deactivated. This was typically (47%) the result of the provider failing to respond to the MAC’s request that they revalidate. Another 29% were the result of the provider/supplier voluntarily withdrawing from the Medicare program. Another 5% of deactivations were the result of the provider/supplier not submitting a claim to Medicare within the previous 12 months. The majority of these were likely individual practitioners (e.g., physicians) that either died, or who retired from professional practice, and who failed to inform the MAC at the time of retirement to request that their provider number be deactivated. This could also include organizational providers that were sold or otherwise no longer operational.
  • These were frequently the result of an individual practitioner (e.g., a physician) failing to deactivate his or her Medicare number upon their retirement, and their either not responding to a request to revalidate, or notifying the MAC of their retirement and agreeing to voluntarily withdraw
  • CMS revoked the billing privileges of 43,000 provider/suppliers. The most common reason cited (61%) was the failure of the provider/supplier to be professionally licensed. However, within the moderate risk category, which includes ambulance, 26% of all revocations were the result of a “CMS-approved revocation,” e.g., the result of some adverse legal action against the provider/supplier which was not properly disclosed to the MAC within 30 days.

 

CMS estimated that its revised screening procedures avoided $2.4 billion in Medicare payments to ineligible providers and suppliers over this period.

CMS also reported that it made several changes to its screening process over this period. This includes the implementation of a continuous license monitoring report in November 2013, and a continuous criminal monitoring report in July 2015. This also includes fingerprint-based criminal background checks for the owners and certain key employees of categorically high-risk providers and suppliers. In December 2015, CMS also began conducting site-visits for certain limited-risk providers and suppliers.

Despite the progress made by CMS, the GAO did find that certain program vulnerabilities still exist. For example, the GAO found that CMS had not established performance measures to monitor its ability to place providers and suppliers in the proper risk categories. The GAO recommended that CMS establish objectives and performance measures for assessing its progress in establishing better screening procedures for new enrollments and revalidations. CMS ultimately agreed with this recommendation.


Have a Medicare question? AAA members, send your inquiry to Brian Werfel, Esq. using our simple form!

 

2015 Medicare Data Shows Evident of Crackdown on Non-Emergency Transport

2015 Medicare Payment Data Offers Evidence of Nationwide Crackdown on Non-Emergency Ground Ambulance Transportation; Impact Varies Dramatically by Medicare Administrative Contractor

Every year, CMS releases data on aggregate Medicare payments for the preceding year. This file is referred to as the Physician/Supplier Procedure Master File (PSP Master File). This past month, CMS released the 2016 PSP Master File, which contains information on all Part B and DME claims processed through the Medicare Common Working File with 2015 dates of service.

In September’s blog post, I discussed the results of the first year of the prior authorization demonstration project for repetitive, scheduled non-emergency ground ambulance transports. During this first year, the project was limited to three states: New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. The data confirms that these three states saw a dramatic reduction in Medicare’s approved payments for dialysis transports.

This month, I will be discussing the national payment trends for non-emergency ground ambulance transports, and, in particular, Basic Life Support non-emergencies.

In 2015, Medicare paid approximately $990 million for BLS non-emergency transports. This is 13% less than what it paid for BLS non-emergency transports in 2014 ($1.14 billion). Please note that these figures only reflect payments for the base rate; when the payments for the associated mileage are included, the reduction is even more dramatic.

In actual terms, this means Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) approved nearly 1 million fewer BLS non-emergency transports in 2015 (5.86 million) than they approved in 2014 (6.81 million). Roughly 75% of this reduction can be directly attributed to the prior authorization program in the three states listed above. Note: the reduction in approved dialysis transports in New Jersey accounts for nearly half of the national decline). However, that leaves nearly 250,000 fewer approved transports in the remaining 47 states. This reduction was not the result of fewer claims being submitted in 2015; the number of submitted claims was actually higher in 2015 than 2014. Rather, the data shows that this reduction is the result of the MACs actively denying many more claims than in year’s past.

I believe these reductions are the direct result of a step-up in the enforcement activities of the MACs, which I also believe has the tacit, if not outright, approval of CMS.

To test this thesis, I looked at the state-by-state data to see if any trends could be found. What I found was that 28 states saw increases in the total number of approved BLS non-emergency transports in 2015, with 19 states seeing decreases. However, on its face, that number is somewhat deceiving. The states that saw increases tended: (1) to see either relatively small increases or (2) had relatively low utilization rates to begin with. The states that saw decreases tended to be larger states with higher utilization rates, and those decreases tended to be larger in percentage terms. For instance, California saw a 21.5% decrease in the number of approved BLS non-emergency transports. Ohio saw an 11.7% decrease.

Digging deeper, it becomes clear that a state’s overall change in payments for BLS non-emergencies is almost perfectly correlated with its change in payments for dialysis transports. In other words, to the extent the state saw an overall reduction in payments for BLS non-emergencies, that reduction – – in nearly all cases – – was the result of the total payments for dialysis decreasing by more than any offsetting increase in the total payments for non-dialysis transports.

These relative changes in dialysis were also highly correlated with the MAC that administers Medicare claims in that state. To the extent your state saw a reduction in dialysis payments, it is highly likely that neighboring states administered by the same MAC saw similar reductions in payments. The following charts will help illustrate this point:

2016-11-29-werfel-non-emergency-crackdown-chart-1As you can see, all three states within Cahaba’s jurisdiction saw a net increase in the total payments for dialysis. While the increases themselves were quite minor in Alabama and Tennessee, Georgia saw an 11.8% increase in total payments for dialysis. Similarly, both Florida and Puerto Rico saw significant increases in the approved payments for dialysis.

By contrast, every state in National Government Services’ (NGS’) jurisdiction with more than 1,000 paid dialysis transports in 2015 saw a net reduction in the total payments for dialysis. These reductions ranged from a relatively minor reduction of 1.17% in New York to a nearly two-thirds (64.58%) reduction in Minnesota.

2016-11-29-werfel-non-emergency-crackdown-chart-2This trend was present in all remaining jurisdictions, although the results were more mixed. For example, with the exception of South Carolina, the three remaining states administered by Palmetto all saw increases. Likewise, the majority of states administered by WPS saw decreases. This included Indiana, which has a sizeable dialysis population. Among WPS states, only Missouri saw a small (3.90%) increase.

California saw a 31.76% decrease in its payments for dialysis. The only other Noridian states with more than 1,000 paid dialysis trips were Hawaii and Washington, which both saw increases.

Novitas presents a more complicated picture, with several large states, such as Texas, seeing double-digit increases in payments for dialysis, while other large states saw sizeable decreases.

All in all, the data suggests that CMS and its contractors continue to pay close attention to the non-emergency side of our business, particularly BLS non-emergency transports. These transports have been under scrutiny for many years, as reports from the Office of Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office and other federal agencies have flagged this portion of our industry as being particularly prone to overutilization (and, in some cases, outright fraud).  However, this heightened scrutiny is not being uniformly applied across-the-board. The data suggests that certain MACs have been far more aggressive in targeting these sorts of trips across their entire jurisdictions, while others seem content to target specific (typically large) states within their jurisdictions. This could serve as a template for how MACs will approach prior authorization in their jurisdictions.

‘Praemonitus, Praemunitus’     

Latin Proverb, loosely translated to “forewarned is forearmed.”

 

 

CMS SMR Contractor Audit Error

Over the past week, we have learned that several ambulance suppliers have received letters from the CMS Supplemental Medical Review Contractor (SMRC), StrategicHealthSolutions, LLC.  These letters indicate that the SMRC is conducting a medical review of their claims.

The letter contains a section that explains why the supplier has been selected for review.  That section contains the following explanation:

The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA), signed into law on April 16, 2015, extended the therapy cap exception process through December 31, 2017, and modified the requirement for manual medical review for services over the $3,700 therapy thresholds.  MACRA eliminated the requirement for manual medical review of all claims exceeding the therapy thresholds and instead allows a targeted review process.  CMS has tasked the SMRC with performing post-payment medical review of Part B therapy claims for providers with a high percentage of patients receiving therapy beyond the threshold as compared to their peers for dates of service July 1, 2015 to the present. 

Our firm contacted the SMRC on behalf of a number of affected providers.  On November 14, 2016, StrategicHealthSolutions responded to our inquiry.  The SMRC indicated that its review was intended to be limited to suppliers of physical therapy services.  Accordingly, the SMRC confirmed that these audit letters were sent to ambulance suppliers in error. 

The SMRC further indicated that ambulance suppliers that received this audit letter in error will be notified by telephone that they were selected in error.  The SMRC will also be sending letters to affected ambulance suppliers notifying them of its error.  These letters are expected to be mailed tomorrow, Tuesday, November 15, 2016.

If your organization received a letter from StrategicHealthSolutions, LLC, please know that this letter was sent in error.  Your organization is not being audited by the Supplemental Medical Review Contractor.  You can expect to receive a phone call and/or a letter in the next few days formally notifying you of the contractor’s error.  That letter should formally withdraw the SMRC’s request for medical records. 

If you received a letter from the SMRC, and have any further questions, please feel free to contact Brian S. Werfel, Esq., the AAA’s Medicare Consultant.  He can be reached via email at bwerfel@aol.com.

CMS List of Medically Unlikely Edits for Ambulance Services

On October 1, 2016, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) updated its list of Medically Unlikely Edits (MUEs). The MEU program is designed to reduce the paid claims error rate for Part B claims. The program operates by estimating the maximum number of units of service that a provider/supplier would report under most circumstances for a single beneficiary on a single date of service. A claim that submits units of service in excess of this threshold will typically be denied by the Medicare Administrative Contractor.

For additional information on the CMS Medically Unlikely Edit Program, click here.

Effective October 1, 2016, claims for ambulance services will be subject to the following MUE edits:

HCPCS Code MUE Threshold
A0425 (Ground Ambulance Mileage) 250
A0426 (Ground Ambulance, ALS Non-Emergency) 2
A0427 (Ground Ambulance, ALS Emergency) 2
A0428 (Ground Ambulance, BLS Non-Emergency) 4
A0429 (Ground Ambulance, BLS Emergency) 2
A0430 (Air Ambulance, Fixed Wing) 1
A0431 (Air Ambulance, Helicopter) 1
A0432 (Ground Ambulance, Paramedic Intercept) 1
A0433 (Ground Ambulance, ALS-2) 1
A0434 (Ground Ambulance, Specialty Care Transport) 2
A0435 (Air Ambulance, Fixed Wing Mileage) 999
A0436 (Air Ambulance, Helicopter Mileage) 300

 

AAA Posts 2015 National and State-Specific Medicare Data

The American Ambulance Association is pleased to announce the publication of its 2015 Medicare Data Payment Report.  This report is based on the Physician/Supplier Procedure Summary Master File.  This report contains information on all Part B and DME claims processed through the Medicare Common Working File and stored in the National Claims History Repository.

The report contains an overview of total Medicare spending nationwide in CY 2015, and then a separate breakdown of Medicare spending in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the various other U.S. Territories.

For each jurisdiction, the report contains two charts: the first reflects data for all ambulance services, while the second is limited solely to dialysis transports.  Each chart lists total spending by procedure code (i.e., base rates and mileage).  For comparison purposes, information is also provided on Medicare spending in CY 2014.

Findings Patterns Where None Exist

On August 16, 2016, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) issued a decision related to CMS’ authority to revoke a Medicare supplier’s billing privileges.  The DAB is the fourth and final level of administrative appeal within the Department of Health and Human Services.

Factual Background

The case involved John P. McDonough III, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist residing in Florida, and two of his affiliated medical practices, Geriatric Psychological Specialists and Geriatric Psychological Specialists II.  In October 2014, First Coast Service Options, Inc., the Medicare Administrative Contractor for Florida, notified McDonough and both medical practices that their Medicare billing numbers were being revoked for alleged abuses of their billing privileges.  Specifically, First Coast indicated that data analysis had revealed that the three suppliers had submitted a total of 420 claims for deceased beneficiaries over an approximately two-year period.

McDonough and his two medical practices appealed for a reconsideration of the revocation of their billing privileges, which was denied in February 2015.   The suppliers then appealed for an ALJ hearing.  The suppliers conceded that they submitted more than 200 claims for beneficiaries that were deceased on the date of service.  However, they attributed these claims to data-entry errors and other clerical mistakes.  The suppliers argued that these were simple billing errors, representing a small percentage of the tens of thousands of claims they submitted during this period of time.   In December 2015, the ALJ issued his decision.  While the ALJ seemingly accepted the suppliers’ explanation that these were billing errors, and that there was no intent on the part of the suppliers’ to submit false claims, the ALJ nevertheless upheld the revocation of their billing privileges.  Citing previous DAB decisions, the ALJ held that the admitted submission of repeated claims for services to deceased beneficiaries due to “incorrect billing entries due to similar beneficiary names or Medicare numbers, and inadvertent typing errors” was not inconsistent with a finding that the suppliers’ had abused their billing privileges.

The suppliers’ then appealed to the DAB. In its decision, the DAB first noted that it has consistently rejected contentions that revocation required a finding that the supplier acted intentionally:

“The Board has long held that the regulation’s plain language does not require CMS to establish fraudulent or dishonest intent to revoke a supplier’s billing privileges under this section and that the regulatory language also does not provide any exception for inadvertent or accidental billing errors.”

The DAB then countered the suppliers’ argument that CMS never intended to revoke a supplier’s billing privileges for simple mistakes.  They cited language from the June 27, 2008 final rule, where CMS stated revocation “is not intended to be used for isolated occurrences or accidental billing errors.”  The DAB noted that CMS, in that same final rule, indicated that it would not consider the submission of three or more improper claims to be accidental.  The DAB also noted that the relatively small percentage of erroneous claims was irrelevant, as the regulation does not require CMS to establish any particular error rate or percentage of improper claims.

The DAB held that since the record established that the suppliers’ had submitted more than 3 claims for deceased beneficiaries, CMS had met the requisite legal standard for revocation.  Accordingly, the DAB upheld the revocation of the suppliers’ billing privileges.

Potential Impact on Ambulance Providers

The DAB’s decision effectively establishes a strict liability standard for revocations based on the submission of claims for deceased beneficiaries.  The submission of three or more such claims over any designated period of time could constitute legal grounds for CMS to revoke a supplier’s Medicare billing privileges. 

The implications of this decision should give every Medicare provider pause.  However, given the nature of our operations, our industry needs to pay particular attention.  The psychologist and therapists that were the subject of the above-referenced case saw patients on a scheduled basis, and spent many hours with each of their patients.  This gave them ample time to obtain insurance information from each of their patients, and to confirm the accuracy of that information.  Yet the suppliers’ still had more than 200 claims billed incorrectly.

EMS providers do not have that luxury.  We frequently encounter patients on the street or at their home.  Many of these patients do not have their insurance information on them at the time of transport.  Even when the patient had this information on their person, under the stress of an emergency medical situation, the paramedic or EMT may not record this information accurately.

As a result, our billing offices spend a good portion of their time trying to verify a patient’s insurance.  Unfortunately, some of the administrative “shortcuts” we have developed to address these problems create the potential to inadvertently submit claims for deceased patients.  While there is nothing at present that suggests that CMS intends to expand the use of its revocation authority, we probably want to rethink these shortcuts.

An example you say?

Consider a transport of an elderly woman to the hospital in an emergency.  The crew does not obtain the patient’s insurance information at the time of transport.  However, they do obtain the hospital face sheet, which lists the patient’s social security number.  To convert this social security number to a Medicare HIC#, we need to include a Medicare suffix.  How would you go about doing that?

One option would be to ping the patient’s name, date of birth and SSN against an eligibility database.  While effective, provider’s typically pay for these lookups.

Another option would be to simply guess what the applicable suffix might be, affix that to the SSN, and submit the claim.  If it goes through, the provider guessed correctly.  If it rejects as an invalid name and HIC# combination, the provider would know to try another suffix.  So let’s assume the provider elects to use this option.  Playing the percentages, the provider would likely add the “B” suffix, on the theory that, given her age, the woman likely qualified for Social Security Benefits (and therefore Medicare benefits) based on the work history of her spouse.  But what if the provider was wrong, and the woman was the primary wage earner in her family?  If that were the case, her suffix would likely be the “A.”  Now imagine that her husband shared the same Social Security numerics, and that his suffix was the “B.”  Further imagine that he has since passed, and the provider has now inadvertently submitted a claim for the dead husband.

Now imagine this happens three times in a year…

Another way we can inadvertently submit claims for dead patients is not using front-end verification.  Many providers submit claims based off the insurance information they received at the time of transport (or from the hospital, nursing home, etc.), without any attempt to confirm its accuracy.  These providers recognize that the insurance information will be correct more often than not.  They are making the calculated decision that it is easier to deal with any issues after they have been identified by the payer.  However, one reason an insurance can come back as invalid is because the crewmember recorded the HIC# incorrectly.  For example, they may transpose a few digits (i.e., they wrote “1243” rather than “1234”).  If the transposed HIC# relates to a deceased beneficiary, that would be captured by the data analytics used by the Medicare contractors.

The DAB’s decision is certainly troubling.  However, I do not believe that our industry needs to overreact.  Rather, I would encourage everyone to view the DAB’s decision as a starting point, and to re-examine their own billing and verification processes to see if there is anything they can do to reduce the likelihood of their organization every confronting this issue.

 


Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog? Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

Prior Authorization Data Shows Dramatic Reductions in Spending on Dialysis Transports

In May 2014, CMS announced the implementation of a three-year prior authorization demonstration project for repetitive scheduled non-emergency ambulance transports.  CMS initially elected to limit this demonstration to three states: New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.  These states were selected based on higher-than-average utilization rates and high rates of improper payment for these services.  The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) had previously singled out these states as having higher than average utilization of dialysis transports in a June 2013 report to Congress.

This demonstration project went into effect on December 15, 2014.  The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) subsequently expanded the demonstration project to five additional states and the District of Columbia on January 1, 2016, with a further expansion to all remaining states expected to occur at some time during 2017.  However, national expansion is contingent upon CMS determining that the demonstration project has been effective in reducing Medicare expenditures without jeopardizing patient’s access to necessary medical care.

Every year, CMS also releases data on aggregate Medicare payments for the preceding year.  This file is referred to as the Physician/Supplier Procedure Master File (PSP Master File).  This past month, CMS released the 2016 PSP Master File, which contains information on all Part B and DME claims processed through the Medicare Common Working File with 2015 dates of service.  I will be discussing this report in greater detail in next month’s blog.

This month, I want to focus on the impact the prior authorization project has had on total dialysis payments in the original three target states.  Reproduced below is a chart tracking the total payments for dialysis transports in these three states between 2010 and 2015.  Interestingly, these three states demonstrated very different trajectories prior to last year.

New Jersey saw a sustained, dramatic increase in payments over that time, increasing from approximately $56 million in 2010 to more than $106 million in 2014, an increase of nearly 90% over a 5-year period.  (Note: spending figures for 2014 and 2015 take into account the 10% reduction in payments for dialysis transports).
werfel-chart

South Carolina saw a much more moderate increase over that same period, increasing from $51 million in 2010 to slightly more than $60 million in 2014, an increase of roughly 18%.  By contrast, payments in Pennsylvania peaked in 2011 at $69.6 million, and have been in steady decline ever since.

While these states’ trajectories were different prior to 2015, the results for 2015 are fairly similar.  Each state saw a significant reduction in the total expenditures for dialysis once the prior authorization project went into effect. 

 The fact that these states saw a reduction in overall spending on dialysis is not surprising (to me at least, I recognize this came as a shock to many providers in these states).  These states were not selected at random; CMS selected these states based on its belief that they were particularly suspect to overutilization.

What I do find surprising is the relative sizes of the declines in these states.  New Jersey and Pennsylvania both experienced a more than 80% reduction in payments for dialysis.  By contrast, the reduction in South Carolina (approximately 25%) was far less dramatic.

Does this suggest that abuse was more prevalent in New Jersey and Pennsylvania?  Perhaps.  An ongoing federal Medicare Strike Force in the Philadelphia metropolitan area has resulted in a number of convictions against fraudulent providers in these states.  However, the impact has not been limited to these alleged “bad actors.”  Even those companies employing accepted best practices have seen significant reductions in their approved patient populations.

To me, the common factor seems to be the applicable Medicare contractor.  New Jersey and Pennsylvania are both administered by Novitas Solutions, Inc., whereas South Carolina is administered by Palmetto GBA.  While Medicare’s coverage standards are intended to be national, it seems reasonable to conclude that Novitas has taken a far harder stance on dialysis than Palmetto.  Anecdotal evidence from the states that came went live with prior authorization in January 2016 seems to confirm this thesis, although we will not be able to know for sure until the 2016 Medicare payment data is released this time next year.

Those of you that have attended this year’s AAA Regional Conferences, or who participated on AAA webinars this past year have heard me say that the Medicare Administrative Contractor’s stance on dialysis is the most important factor in determining whether an ambulance provider needs to rethink its current approach to its repetitive patient population.  To the extent the MAC takes a fairly lenient stance, providers will likely find that only a few “tweaks” are needed to align their existing practices with a prior authorization regime.  AAA members in these states may even find it worthwhile to even considering expanding the spectrum of patients they accept for transport. If, however, the MAC takes a fairly restrictive stances (as Novitas has clearly done), providers will likely find it necessary to dramatically trim these populations, or to arrange for alternative sources of payment for these transports.

I also encourage AAA members to attend our panel discussion at this year’s Annual Conference & Tradeshow in exciting Las Vegas (November 7 – 9th).  I have the privilege of serving as the moderator for a panel consisting of several providers that are currently operating under the prior authorization project.  These providers will talk about their experiences, and will be able to offer helpful tips on how to best navigate this major shift in Medicare’s coverage rules. (See full Conference Agenda)

Have an issue you would like to see discussed in a future Talking Medicare blog?  Please write to me at bwerfel@aol.com.

CMS Issues Transmittal on Changes to Ambulance Staffing Requirements

CMS Issues Transmittal on Changes to Ambulance Staffing Requirements; Clarifications to Service Level Definitions for Ground Ambulance Services

On September 12, 2016, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued Transmittal 226.  This Transmittal incorporates the recent changes to the vehicle staffing requirements into the Medicare Online Manual System.  The Transmittal is also intended to provide clarification on the definitions for certain levels of ground ambulance service.  The changes made by this Transmittal go into effect on December 12, 2016. 

 Vehicle Staffing Requirements

 In the CY 2016 Physician Fee Schedule final rule (November 16, 2015), CMS revised its regulations related to the staffing of ground ambulance services.  Previously, the Medicare regulations at 42 C.F.R. 410.41 required that all ground ambulances be staffed by a minimum of two crewmembers, at least one of whom must be certified as an EMT-Basic and who must be legally authorized to operate all of the lifesaving and life-sustaining equipment on board the vehicle.  For ALS vehicles, there was a further requirement that at least one of the two crewmembers must be certified as a paramedic or EMT and qualified to perform one or more ALS services.

In the 2016 final rule, CMS revised the regulation to further require that the ambulance supplier meet all applicable state and local laws related to the staffing of vehicles.  CMS indicated that these changes are intended to address jurisdictions that impose more stringent requirements on ambulance providers (e.g., a requirement that both staff members be certified as EMTs).  CMS further indicated that these changes were prompted, in part, by a report from the HHS Office of the Inspector General, which expressed concern over the fact that the current regulations do not set forth licensure or certification requirements for the second crew member.

In this Transmittal, CMS is updating Section 10.1.2 of Chapter 10 of the Medicare Benefit Policy Manual to reflect the changes to the underlying regulations.  Specifically, the Manual Section now makes clear that BLS and ALS vehicles must meet the staffing requirements under state and local laws.  For BLS vehicles, the new definition also clarifies that at least one of the crewmembers must be certified at a minimum at the EMT-Basic level by the state or local authority where the services are being furnished.  For ALS vehicles, the new definition clarifies that at least one of the crewmembers must be certified as an EMT-Intermediate or EMT-Paramedic by the state or local authority where the services are being furnished.

Note: A number of AAA members have expressed concern with the reference to “EMT-Intermediate” in the paragraph defining the staffing requirements for ALS vehicles.  These members note that their state may be moving away from the “EMT-I” designation, in favor of the “Advanced EMT,” “EMT-Enhanced,” or other similar designation.  These members expressed concern that Medicare contractors may interpret this clarification literally, and therefore downgrade claims properly billed ALS based on the services provided by Advanced EMTs or other higher EMT certifications.

The AAA recognizes the concerns expressed by these members.  It should be noted that the Manual changes being made by this Transmittal accurately reflect the current wording of the regulation.  It should also be noted that these changes do not impact the definition of “Advanced Life Support (ALS) personnel” set forth in 42 C.F.R. §414.605.  While that definition also makes reference to the EMT-Intermediate licensure, the definition makes clear that any individual trained to a higher level than the EMT-Basic licensure qualifies as an ALS crewmember.

Ground Ambulance Service Definitions

 The Transmittal also makes a number of clarifications to the ground ambulance services definitions set forth in Section 30.1.1 of Chapter 10 of the Medicare Benefit Policy Manual.  These changes are summarized below:

  • Basic Life Support (BLS) – CMS is revising the definition to align with the new minimum staffing requirements discussed above.
  • Basic Life Support (BLS) – Emergency – The current definition of the BLS emergency level of service reads as follows:

When medically necessary, the provision of BLS services, as specified above, in the context of an emergency response.  An emergency response is one that, at the time the ambulance provider or supplier is called, it responds immediately.  An immediate response is one in which the ambulance provider/supplier begins as quickly as possible to take the steps necessary to respond to the call.”

 CMS is removing the second and third sentences of the current definition.  In their place, CMS is inserting a parenthetical referencing the definition of an “emergency response” later in this same section of the manual.

  • Advanced Life Support, Level 1 (ALS1) – CMS is revising the definition to align with the new minimum staffing requirements discussed above. It is also clarifying that the ALS assessment must be provided by ALS personnel.
  • Advanced Life Support Assessment – The existing definition in the CMS Manual ends with the following sentence: “An ALS assessment does not necessarily result in a determination that the patient requires an ALS level of service.” In recent years, a number of Medicare contractors have interpreted this sentence to mean that the provision of a valid ALS assessment would not necessarily entitle the ambulance supplier to bill for the ALS emergency base rate, unless the documentation clearly established the provision of an ALS intervention.

CMS is adding a sentence to the end of the definition that clarifies that an ambulance supplier would be permitted to bill for the ALS emergency base, even if the ALS assessment results in a determination that the patient would not require one or more ALS interventions.  CMS further clarified that the ability to bill for an ALS emergency base rate is predicated on the ambulance transport otherwise meeting the medical necessity requirement.

  • Advanced Life Support, Level 1 (ALS1) – Emergency – Similar to the change to the definition of BLS emergency discussed above, CMS is removing the second and third sentences of the current definition, and replacing them with a parenthetical reference to the definition of an “emergency response.”
  • Advanced Life Support, Level 2 (ALS2) – CMS is rewording the definition, without making any substantive change. ALS-2 continues to be billable in situations involving a medically necessary transport of a patient, where the crew either: (1) provides one of the seven listed ALS-2 procedures (manual defibrillation/cardioversion, endotracheal intubation, etc.) or (2) the administration of three or more medications by IV push/bolus or continuous infusion.  The changes largely relate to how you count, for purposes of determining whether you can bill ALS-2, multiple administrations of the same IV medication.  Conceptually, CMS is indicating that a single “dose” requires a suitable quantity and amount of time between administrations, in accordance with standard medical protocols.  CMS is further indicating that a deliberate attempt to administer a standard dose in increments would not qualify as ALS-2.  In sum, to the extent a medication is administered in standard doses in accordance with pre-existing protocols, each separate administration would count separately towards the ALS-2 standard of three or more administrations; however, any attempt to cut the standard dose into multiple administrations would count as only a single administration for purposes of determining whether the ALS-2 standard was met.
  • Specialty Care Transport (SCT) – CMS is rewording the language in the “Application” section of this definition, without making any substantive change.
  • Paramedic Intercept (PI) – CMS is revising the definition to reflect the change in how a “rural area” is identified. The old definition included any area: (1) designed as rural by a state law or regulation or (2) any area outside a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or in New England, outside a New England County Metropolitan Area.  Under the new definition, an area is considered rural to the extent it is designated as such by state law or regulation or to the extent it is located in a rural census tract of an MSA using the most recent version of the Goldsmith Modification.
  • Services in a Rural Area – CMS is eliminating the reference to New England County Metropolitan Areas, as these areas are no longer relevant to a determination of rural. Under the new definition, an area will be considered rural to the extent: (1) it is located outside a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or (2) is identified as rural using the most recent version of the Goldsmith Modification, even though the area falls within an MSA.
  • Emergency Response – CMS is adding language clarifying that the nature of an ambulance provider’s response (i.e., emergent or non-emergent) does not independently establish medical necessity for the ambulance transport.
  • Interfacility Transport – CMS is adding a new definition for the purposes of billing SCT, which establishes that the interfacility transportation requirement is met whenever the origin and destination are both one of the following: (1) a hospital or skilled nursing facility that participates in the Medicare program or (2) a hospital-based facility that meets Medicare’s requirements for provider-based status.

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